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CAN ERIE SURVIVE AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW?
CRAIG GREEN*
A remarkable aspect of this symposium is its self-conscious effort
to straddle theory and doctrine. On the theoretical side, our title
“Law Without a Lawmaker” gestures toward an abyss of impondera-
bles. If law without lawmakers were even conceivable, who or what
would make such law? And if law without lawmakers is not made
by anyone, has it somehow existed forever and always? Even
explaining law without lawmakers by reference to an arguably
lawmaking divinity or social consensus might not save such unmade
law from its skeptics.
By contrast, the prospectus accompanying our symposium shifts
quickly from theory to Erie.1 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is a
chestnut among American legal technicians, as it prescribes
applicable law for federal courts that exercise diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction. Regardless of existential disputes that
surround “law without a lawmaker,” Erie’s doctrinal status is
overwhelmingly secure.2
Some readers might be unsettled by fusions of high theory and
workaday doctrine, yet theoretico-doctrinal analyses of Erie have
surfaced throughout the legal academy. For at least two decades,
Erie has been the case that launched a thousand ships, as a gen-
eration of scholars has sought guidance from Erie about topics
ranging from customary international law to state choice of law,
from federal common law to jurisprudential theory.3 Each of these
* Professor of Law, Temple University; M.A., Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law
School. Many thanks for thoughtful comments from participants in this symposium, and from
my colleagues Rick Greenstein and Laura Little. Thanks also to Kelly Arbogast, Julia Melle,
Carlos Munoz, and especially Julia Kelly for outstanding research assistance.
1. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4504, at 26-29
(2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2010) (discussing Erie’s doctrinal developments in the Supreme Court).
3. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 320-31 (1997) (customary
international law); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651,
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interpretations has characterized Erie not just as an ordinary de-
cision with facts and a holding, but as an iconic representation of
broad constitutional or jurisprudential principles.
This Article takes stock of Erie’s florescence. To preview my con-
clusions, I tend to resist most connections between Erie and wider
fields of legal doctrine, yet I think that debates over Erie’s meaning
can illuminate links between legal theory and legal history. Many
present-day theorists invoke the cultural authority of doctrinal icons
like Erie without identifying connections to the judicial opinion’s
text, context, original meaning, precedential trajectory, or historical
reconstruction.4 Abstract methodologies like originalism, textualism,
and “living” dynamism are familiar when it comes to interpreting
statutes, constitutions, or treaties.5 Yet similar methodologies for
708-15 (1995) (predicting and ascertaining state law); Michael Steven Green, Erie’s
Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1115 (2011) (horizontal choice of law); J. Andrew
Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 498-99
(2007) (international impact of the United States Constitution); Julian Ku & John Yoo,
Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004
SUP. CT. REV. 153, 163-66 (application of the Alien Tort Statute); Ernest A. Young, Preemption
at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 274, 279 (1999) (maritime preemption).
4. This trend toward transhistorical theorization coexists with a contemporary emphasis
on history in constitutional interpretation. See G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 5 (2007). And of course, many histories have analyzed icons like Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and
even Erie, 304 U.S. 64. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER
MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE (1937); TONY ALLAN FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE
SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1975); WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2000); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE: THE
ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA (1989); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 6 (1979); James M.
O’Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992); Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56
TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1978).
5. E.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); STEPHEN BREYER,
ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  (1980); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 685-91 (1990); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 885 (1985); Lawrence B.
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and
the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 155-57, 159 (2006).
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interpreting judicial decisions have drawn less attention.6 This
Article will not endorse anything like “originalism for judicial
opinions.”7 Instead, I simply propose that expansive applications of
Erie—if construed as representative models for interpreting iconic
cases—could raise some of the same jurisprudential problems that
Erie’s theorists wish to solve. This Article also suggests that Erie,
like its predecessor Swift v. Tyson, should be understood as an
example of federal common law—not as a barrier restricting it.
Part I begins by characterizing Erie as quite a radical decision in
its day. I will argue that, even though the Court’s reasoning about
constitutional federalism was terribly flawed, Erie’s result seemed
urgently necessary in 1938 and remains vital today. Much of this
history is familiar but underappreciated. Lawyers are often taught
that Erie is essential, but they less often grasp precisely why or
how.8 Reviewing what Erie said, and why, will create a useful base-
line for evaluating various interpretations of the decision.
Part II considers modern theories of Erie that have little textual
support in the Court’s opinion. Some scholars have proposed that
cases like Erie contain “no law” for federal courts to apply other
than state law.9 By these assessments, Erie’s result was either
inevitable, demanded by right-thinking jurisprudence, or required
by constitutional due process. I believe that such theories confuse
Erie’s result with its justification. Erie famously declared that
6. But see Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test
the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 468-69 (2001)
(reviewing HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999) and applying behavioralist
theory to interpret judicial decisions).
7. Indeed, I will try to avoid taking a stance on the desirability of originalism, or other
grand interpretive theories, in any legal context.
8. Cf. Robert J. Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine and
Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 567-69 (2005) (attributing confusion among
lawyers to Erie’s divergent representations in casebooks, such that “a person’s understanding
of [the doctrine] will depend almost wholly upon the book and teacher from which and whom
it was first learned”).
9. E.g., Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated State Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 827
(2011); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means
of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1840-41 (2005); Louise Weinberg, The Curious
Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV.
860, 871 (1989).
816 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:813
“[t]here is no federal general common law.”10 But that was a
performative edict, not a preexisting reality. On the day before Erie,
there was indeed federal general common law; there was a lot of it.
Every federal court in the country had applied federal general
common law, and hundreds of cases each year had relied upon such
law for nearly a century.11 Modern assertions that then-operative
“law” was “not law” seem to evaluate pre-Erie decisions using mod-
ern conflicts theories, as though the latter were persistent or
natural truths.12 Erie’s own history illustrates how quickly such
theories can change.
Part III analyzes Erie’s relationship to legal theory, legal history,
and conflicts of law. One of the legal academy’s great ambitions is
to confirm, dispute, or revise conventional wisdom about existing
legal doctrine and practice.13 And although some of these intellec-
tual ventures rely solely on logic and common sense, many follow
legal professionals by citing conventional authorities like Erie. In
recent decades, Erie’s venerable name has appeared in immensely
wide-ranging debates, and this Article questions in general terms
whether the decision’s link to some of these issues is overstated.
Without disparaging the use of Erie as a quasi-literary source
that illustrates jurisprudential points by evocative echo or analogy,
I propose that applications of many iconic cases might benefit from
closer attention to judicial language and historical context. For Erie
in particular, such scrutiny does not favor the decision’s broadest
applications. Instead, I think that Erie is best interpreted as a
subconstitutional ruling about choice of law in federal courts. On
that revised footing, Erie’s concern to abolish “federal general com-
mon law” would not be a trump card that can easily bolster and
10. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
11. See FREYER, supra note 4, at 156-58.
12. E.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can
Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1264-99 (1999).
13. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Use of Law Schools, in SPEECHES 28, 34-35 (1896)
(“[Law professors] have said that to make a general principle worth anything you must give
it a body; you must show in what way and how far it would be applied actually in an actual
system; you must show how it has gradually emerged as the felt reconciliation of concrete
instances no one of which established it in terms. Finally, [law professors] must show its
historic relations to other principles, often of very different date and origin, and thus set it in
the perspective without which its proportions will never be truly judged.”); Edward L. Rubin,
The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1847-53, 1895 (1988).
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embody grand legal theories. The only good Erie, I would suggest,
is a small Erie.
I. THE “SWITCH IN TIME” THAT SAVED DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Because Erie is so uncontroversial today, its radical history is
easy to forget. From at least 1842 until 1938, federal courts decided
stacks of cases based on what Erie would call “federal general
common law.”14 In federal cases involving diversity, pendent, or
ancillary jurisdiction, federal general common law allowed federal
judges to deviate from state law that would have governed similar
cases brought in state court.15 That term of art, “federal general
common law,” described pre-Erie circumstances perfectly. Such law
was “federal” because it was created by federal courts and applied
exclusively in federal cases without preempting state common law
in state court.16 It was crafted using “common-law” reasoning and
techniques, and it did not purport to displace or apply any form of
statutory or constitutional law.17 It was “general” in the same sense
as other tort and contract law: it was based upon broad judgments
14. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842); Patrick J.
Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New
World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 112-15 (1993). For discussion of the prevalence
and ambiguous scope of federal common law in the early Republic, see Stewart Jay, Origins
of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1323 (1985) (“The most we can
conclude from a survey of jurisdictional theory from the Hudson period is that it was generally
conceded that federal courts had what we would term significant common-law powers.”). 
15. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 360 (1910); Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68
U.S. 175, 206-07 (1863); cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)
(describing Erie’s application to state claims brought under pendent jurisdiction); Note, The
Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 1018, 1043 n.142 (1962) (“Although there may have been some doubts originally as to
whether Erie was limited to diversity cases, it is now generally recognized that the underlying
concern of Erie—uniformity of decision by all courts within the same state—is equally
applicable to pendent jurisdiction cases.” (citations omitted)). Of course, none of this implies
that Swift and Erie issues have arisen exclusively in cases involving particular jurisdictional
grants. 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 4520, at 635-41.
16. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19; see also James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins
of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 294 n.448
(2004) (“[T]he federal common law rules announced in diversity cases before Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins were not binding precedent in state court proceedings.... [T]he notion of federal
common law rules directly limiting state court authority—a hallmark of modern federal
common law—was foreign to nineteenth-century jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)). 
17. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19; FREYER, supra note 4, at 40.
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concerning efficiency and fairness.18 Federal general common law
under Swift was also separated from peculiarly “local” institutions
and issues, such as real estate or slavery.19
As a historical matter, the Swift regime did not rest on high
jurisprudential theory. Federal judges simply believed that state
courts were sometimes terribly wrong in making common-law
rulings about commerce, torts, contracts, and the like.20 America’s
greatest conflicts scholar, Joseph Story, held in Swift that when
Congress clearly granted federal jurisdiction, but did not declare
that state law must be binding, federal courts retained common-law
authority to make their own substantive decisions.21 This mecha-
nism of federal general common law allowed federal courts, within
the confines of their own federal cases, to avoid perpetrating injus-
tices, inefficiencies, and stupidities that federal judges perceived in
various state cases.22 As the Supreme Court once roared: “We shall
never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal
has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.”23 Federal judges felt
sure that they could reason about the subjects of general common
law just as well as their state-commissioned brethren. Thus, in the
presence of statutory jurisdiction, and in the absence of statutory
constraint, such judges saw no reason to become ventriloquists for
state courts and state common law.24
18. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 19 (“[Q]uestions of general commercial law ... [depend] upon
general reasoning and legal analogies.”); id. (“[T]he true interpretation and effect [of contracts
and commercial instruments] are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but
in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.”).
19. Id. at 18-19. A notable interplay of local and general law appears in Rowan v. Runnels,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847). Authored by Chief Justice Taney, Rowan enforced a sales
contract for slaves despite a state constitutional provision that had banned the transportation
of such slaves into the state. FREYER, supra note 4, at 48-49.
20. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-76 (1938).
21. See Swift, 41 U.S. at 9. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 247 (3d ed. 2005) (“[Story’s] seminal work on conflict of laws [in 1837]
systematized a new field (at least new to the United States) out of virtually nothing.”).
22. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-76.
23. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 206-07 (1863).
24. Cf. Sybron Transition Corp. v. Sec. Ins. of Hartford, 258 F.3d 595, 597 (7th Cir. 2001)
(“[I]f in a usual diversity case the federal court acts as a ventriloquist’s dummy for the state
judiciary, we are playing this hand double dummy: the second circuit has interpreted New
York law, and we are interpreting the work of the second circuit.”); Richardson v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (“In searching for the correct legal rule ... ,
we are not here compelled by [Erie] to play the rule [sic] of ventriloquist’s dummy to the courts
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The Supreme Court held in the late twentieth century that the
federal diversity statute is not a license for federal courts to make
substantive law.25 But I would stress that Swift’s contrary result
was not absurd in the abstract. Just as Article III had contem-
plated, Congress granted diversity jurisdiction, and this led federal
courts to face cases in which federal statutes, treaties, and the
Constitution prescribed neither applicable substantive law nor
choice-of-law rules.26
Jurisdictional grants that do not specify substantive law, and
thus require judicial lawmaking, are not at all rare. Whether one
reviews English colonialism, territorial courts under the Northwest
Ordinance, or the broad run of state tribunals, courts must have fre-
quently confronted legislative grants of jurisdiction without sub-
stantive guidance.27 Swift’s choice to apply its own judicially crafted
rules of substantive law—rather than those of New York’s courts—
implied a federal judicial authority to create such substantive rules.
Federal courts correspondingly asserted and exercised the power to
limit federal general common law, applying such rules to only some
issues decided in diversity cases.28 Federal courts also invoked
of some particular state; as we understand it, ‘federal law,’ not ‘local law,’ is applicable.”).
25. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996) (“Federal diversity
jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the adjudication of state-created rights, but it
does not carry with it generation of rules of substantive law.”); cf. City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (“Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general
common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules
of decision.”).
26. The Rules of Decision Act was only an arguable and partial exception. See Craig
Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 600 n.23 (2008) (describing debates over
the Rules of Decision Act).
27. See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1569-70
(2008) (“[T]he Founders understood that in creating courts, they were creating bodies capable
of acting in ways that would impose obligations on parties properly brought before them.”);
id. at 1569 (“The grants to the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction over the states and to
federal courts generally of jurisdiction in admiralty presuppose judge-made law that will have
purchase without the Senate ever having a participatory chance.”); cf. Northwest Ordinance
of 1787, art. II, reprinted in 1 U.S.C. LVI (2006) (“The inhabitants of the said territory shall
always be entitled to the benefits of ... judicial proceedings according to the course of the
common law.”); 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS & BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 1-2 (“Eighteenth century lawyers made
much of the idea ... that an Englishman carries his law with him to a new country.... Closer
to truth, because demonstrable, is the proposition that what went with the adventurers was
what Montesquieu called the spirit of the laws.”).
28. See supra note 15.
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lawmaking authority not to make federal general common law
preemptive with respect to state courts’ common-law decisions.29
Although federal general common law’s nonpreemptive status is
sometimes criticized, and it certainly seems odd today,30 such
nonpreemption must at the time have seemed like a useful compro-
mise that simultaneously protected state courts’ autonomy to decide
state cases and federal courts’ autonomy to avoid perceived errors.
This is how matters stood for almost one hundred years, but the
verb “stood” does not imply stasis. Federal courts continually de-
cided cases using federal general common law, but courts floundered
in prescribing such law’s scope and substance. From 1842 to 1938,
the analytical boundaries of federal general common law were
frequently confused.31 Problems arose not only in distinguishing
“general” law from “local” law but also in separating “common law”
from statutory and constitutional interpretation, as these categories
were applied to regulate state and federal courts’ interpretive
authority.32
More importantly, federal courts in the late nineteenth century
were targets of intense political and cultural critique. The Lochner
era’s decisions about economic due process, federalism, and labor
injunctions are famous examples.33 But federal courts were also
attacked as retrograde, antiprogressive lawmakers because of
federal general common law decisions that enforced municipal
bonds and the fellow-servant rule, for example.34 Time and again,
federal judges were characterized as out of touch with a changing
economy and democracy; as prorailroad, procorporation, and procap-
italist; and as craven minions of large-scale business and East Coast
Empire.
29. See supra note 16.
30. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional
Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 930-48 (1988); Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of
the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459,
1517-35 (1997); Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism,
84 VA. L. REV. 673, 673-75 (1998).
31. See FREYER, supra note 4, at 35-37, 55-56, 73-77, 84-86, 92-96, 99-100; see also
PURCELL, supra note 4, at 51-56.
32. FREYER, supra note 4, at 45-75.
33. See PURCELL, supra note 4, at 85-91.
34. See FREYER, supra note 4, at 63-71, 87-88; PURCELL, supra note 4, at 13-16.
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Federal constitutional rulings in this era led to FDR’s unsuccess-
ful Court-packing plan; they ended when the Court changed course
and FDR picked new Justices to replace retirees.35 Likewise, these
same national politics, academic protests, and judicial retirements
influenced federal general common law.36 The Court responded by
scrapping nearly a century of Swift-era case law even more sud-
denly and firmly than the so-called constitutional “revolution of
1937” with respect to commerce power.37 By some metrics, American
judicial history has never seen a more dramatic reversal than Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.38
Along with the magnitude of Erie’s result, another notable feature
is the decision’s transparently weak reasoning.39 Justice Brandeis’s
majority opinion was split into three enumerated sections that ex-
plicitly separated Erie’s social and political problems from the
Court’s declared holding. The opinion’s first two sections described
Swift, its precedential trajectory over the years, and widely various
35. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 11-25, 208 (1998); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A
LIFE 713-20 (2009).
36. See generally Borchers, supra note 14, at 97; Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 483 (1928). 
37. See William Lasser, Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937—Was
There a “Switch in Time”?, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1348-51 (2000) (reviewing BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
(1998)).
38. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 272 (1941) (“[I]n
some respects [Erie was] one of the most remarkable in the Court’s history.”); Kurt T. Lash,
The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential
Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 461 n.12 (2001) (“There is no doubt ... that Erie was viewed
at the time as a revolutionary decision.”).
39. See, e.g., Green, supra note 26, at 602-14; cf. 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 4505,
at 52-53 (noting Erie’s “remarkably abbreviated” and “puzzling” constitutional holding);
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 756 (1986) (“Long after Erie,
there was widely shared uncertainty as to the reach of its constitutional holding.”); Judith
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78
IND. L.J. 223, 237 n.69 (2003) (noting “the murky bases of the decision in Erie itself, [ ] which
lacks specificity on what exactly was unconstitutional”); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman,
Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 341 n.97 (1980)
(“[T]he supposed constitutional error at issue here—the error of creating common law where
the legislature does not desire it—is not the kind of error which the courts are alone in being
able to correct, because the legislature itself can correct it anytime it so chooses, simply by
enacting superseding legislation.... If one persists in framing the argument in constitutional
terms, it cannot be for functional reasons, but must be for reasons of emphasis.”).
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criticisms of federal general common law.40 These sections included
commentary on the Rules of Decision Act and an odd reference to
“equal protection of the law.”41 Yet the Court made clear that “the
injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson”
were independent of Erie’s ground for decision.42 In notably specific
language, the Court’s holding relied exclusively upon “the unconsti-
tutionality of the course pursued” under the Swift regime, as
described in section three of the Brandeis opinion.43
Section three, addressing Swift’s unconstitutionality, is an ana-
lytical hodgepodge. There are two bare declarations of Erie’s result
—“the law to be applied in any case [like Erie] is the law of the
[S]tate,” and “[t]here is no federal general common law”44—and the
Court offers two supporting arguments. Of the latter, one quotes
Justice Holmes concerning the “fallacy” of Swift-era common law.45
According to Holmes, federal general common law could exist only
as a “transcendental body of law” that lacked any “definite authority
behind it”—he elsewhere called such law “a brooding omnipres-
ence.”46 For Holmes, this violation of legal theory represented “an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United
States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should
make us hesitate to correct.”47
Other scholars have shown the bankruptcy of Erie’s arguments
about legal positivism.48 In shortest form, I would simply note that
40. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-78 (1938).
41. Id. at 74-75 (“[Under Swift] grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens ...
rendered impossible equal protection of the law.”). See generally Green, supra note 26, at 603
(explaining that “Erie did not—and could not—reverse Swift as violating the constitutional
equal protection” because, inter alia, the Supreme Court did not apply the Equal Protection
Clause to the federal government until 1954).
42. Erie, 304 U.S. at 76.
43. Id. at 77-78 (“The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or limiting diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. Other legislative relief has been proposed. If only a question of statutory
construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued ... compels us
to do so.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
44. Id. at 78.
45. Id. at 79.
46. Id. (“transcendental body of law”); S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“brooding omnipresence”).
47. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Holmes).
48. E.g., Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 30, at 675 (“[T]he many outstanding mysteries
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a legal “fallacy” is no proof at all of unconstitutionality. Just as the
Constitution “does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,”49
it also does not enact John Austin’s lectures on jurisprudence,50
H.L.A. Hart’s Concept of Law,51 or any work concerning twenty-first-
century positivism.52 Furthermore, as Part II of this Article ex-
plains, common-law decisions by federal courts about torts or
contracts were not more “antipositivist” than state court decisions
on similar topics.53 Both judiciaries relied on general principles of
justice and righteousness, and the Constitution no more forbids
federal courts from pursuing such goals than it forbids state courts
from doing so. Theoretical imperatives of this sort, regardless of
their conceptual validity and coherence, do not qualify as constitu-
tional objections.
Brandeis’s second argument in section three offers Erie’s only
explicitly constitutional analysis, and it is based upon Lochner-era
federalism. Here is the Court’s reasoning in full:
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a [s]tate whether they be local in their nature
or “general,” be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts.... We merely declare that in
applying [Swift,] this Court and the lower courts have invaded
rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to
the several [s]tates.54
Almost no one embraces this argument as stated, and in a world of
expansive commerce power, it is obvious why. The scope and
strength of congressional “power” have increased greatly since 1938,
and enclaves of “reserved” states’ rights are correspondingly few.55
about the practical implications of Erie’s holding cannot, as many think, be resolved by
recourse to legal positivism.”).
49. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
50. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1-30, 126-96 (1832). 
51. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
52. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS (1991).
53. See infra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
54. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
55. See Craig Green, Erie and Problems of Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661,
689 (2008) (“The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen the birth of many important
individual rights, which are enforced against the states through a combination of
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Brandeis quoted an 1893 dissent by Justice Field, but that approach
to dual federalism was becoming antique when Erie was decided; it
is defunct today.56 Erie’s constitutional holding was never “one of the
modern cornerstones of our federalism.”57 More accurately, its
reasoning was an outdated vestige of the previous generation’s
federalism, which the Supreme Court had already begun to reject.58
Problems with Erie’s constitutional argument are obvious when
one considers two hypothetical statutes. The first states: “In federal
cases affecting interstate commerce, federal courts shall not be
bound to follow state common law.” The second says: “In federal
cases affecting interstate commerce, federal courts shall not be
bound to follow state choice-of-law rules.” If readers preferred, both
hypothetical statutes could eschew federal preemption in state
courts, thereby explicitly resurrecting Swift in the spheres of both
substantive law and conflicts.
In my view, these might be somewhat stupid statutes, yet each
would be unquestionably constitutional, thus confuting Erie’s
holding that Congress and federal courts—equally and in parallel
—have “no power” to declare “substantive rules of common law
applicable in a [s]tate.”59 Congress has extensive power to authorize
such common law, and in the presence of congressional authoriza-
tion, federal courts have full constitutional authority to make
nonpreemptive legal rules.60
In some respects, the Court’s opinion in Erie manifests the ambiv-
alence of its author. Brandeis was a progressive champion who
congressional and judicial action. These rights have made many state and ‘local’ issues
federal, and have radically pruned states’ claims to constitutionally protected sovereignty and
respect.”); see also Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the
Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 139 (2001) (“By 1950, the Supreme
Court had abandoned the enterprise [of dual federalism]—not just in terms of defining the
limits of the federal commerce power, but also in terms of limiting state power under the
preemption and dormant Commerce Clause doctrines.”).
56. Compare Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79 (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S.
368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)), with Green, supra note 26, at 607-09 (discussing
Baugh’s significance for Erie), and Young, supra note 55, at 139 (describing dual federalism’s
“ignominious death”).
57. It was Justice Harlan who proposed that Erie was a “modern cornerstone.” Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389-90, 397-400 (1937); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25, 537-39 (1934).
59. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
60. See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
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typically promoted judicial restraint and opposed unnecessary
constitutional decisions.61 In Erie, however, his opinion discarded
those commitments and relied on federalist doctrines that had
restricted governmental power during the Lochner era.62 Erie also
failed to apply Brandeisian ideas about states as laboratories.63
Because federal general common law did not preempt state law,
Swift never affected any state-law lab experiments. If anything, the
existence of federal general common law allowed closer comparisons
between common-law rules in federal and state courts, thereby
clarifying various rules’ experimental results.64
In Erie, Brandeis was willing to scrap established precedent,
upset expectations, transform the federal judiciary, and stir the
warm embers of constitutional federalism. Why did he do this?
Perhaps he wanted to mitigate the “curse of bigness,” stopping
corporations from manipulating federal jurisdiction for litigative
advantage.65 Consider Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., which Brandeis cited in
section one of his opinion to illustrate Swift’s “defects, political and
social.”66 Under Black & White Taxicab, many corporate entities
could dissolve and reincorporate in different states simply to get
themselves in or out of federal court.67 Under the Swift-era regime,
61. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 4, at 115-21.
62. Scholars disagree about whether Erie truly relied on the Tenth Amendment. See id.
at 178-80 (arguing that the Tenth Amendment argument plays no central part in Erie). But
see Erie, 304 U.S. at 80 (holding that Swift “invaded rights which ... are reserved by the
Constitution to the several [s]tates”).
63. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
[s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
64. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and
the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1992 (2011) (arguing that federal courts should be open
to “cross-systemic pollination of interpretive theory”).
65. See generally, e.g., UROFSKY, supra note 35, at 300-26 (discussing Justice Brandeis’s
stance as an “opponent of big business and monopoly”).
66. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-74 (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)).
67. See FREYER, supra note 4, at 102 (speculating that in the period between the turn of
the century and the Great Depression, “as much as 80 percent of [diversity cases] involved
corporations engaged in interstate enterprise ... [as] corporations developed the practice of
reorganizing in states with loose incorporation laws, solely for purposes of creating diversity
of citizenship ... to avoid state law when it was against them”).
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this kind of manipulation could decisively alter substantive law and
results.68
Erie did not directly eliminate the Black & White Taxicab sce-
nario; Tompkins’s case had nothing to do with corporate citizenship,
domicile, or eligibility for diversity jurisdiction. Instead, what Erie
accomplished was to lower the practical stakes of jurisdictional
manipulations. By eliminating federal general common law, Erie re-
duced the substantive significance of diversity jurisdiction, thereby
deflating federal courts’ reputation as antiprogressive lawmakers.69
As we have seen, these practical consequences were not part of the
Supreme Court’s holding in Erie, and the Court did not offer any
conceptual analysis of judicial power.70 
Yet I think that, beneath the surface, both Erie and Swift were
pragmatic responses to historically particular problems. In Swift,
the perceived issue was forcing federal judges in federal cases to
unjustly impose badly wrought state common law.71 In Erie, the
perceived problem was allowing federal judges in federal cases to
impose badly wrought federal general common law. The doctrinal
differences between Swift and Erie reflect different priorities in
balancing these systemic risks, and it is possible—though who can
really say—that each judgment was quite defensible given its own
historical circumstances.
II. DID SWIFT PRODUCE LAW WITHOUT A LAWMAKER?
Legal theorists sometimes acknowledge flaws in Erie’s constitu-
tional arguments, yet even these critics tend to mimic Brandeis’s
68. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[k]nowing that the
Courts of Kentucky held contracts of the kind in question invalid and that the Courts of the
United States maintained them as valid,” the plaintiffs reincorporated in the state favorable
to their suit in order to bring the action); see also FREYER, supra note 4, at 104 (“The
company’s reincorporation was for the express purpose, as stated in the brief, of creating
federal diversity jurisdiction.”).
69. Cf. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 196 (“Aside from their shared surprise, commentators
agreed that the [Erie] decision would have important social consequences. Most seemed to
acknowledge that Swift had led to serious abuses, and many noted its social and economic
significance. ‘[I]n nine cases out of ten,’ commented two writers, Swift had worked ‘to the
advantage of a corporate litigant.’”).
70. See Green, supra note 26, at 618-22 (discussing conceptual deficiencies in Erie-based
attacks on federal common law).
71. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
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opinion in assuming that because Erie is a big case, it needs a big
constitutional warrant.72 A popular candidate for this constitutional
cameo role is separation of powers. Despite Brandeis’s explicit
connection between congressional and judicial power, and despite
his historically specific target of federal general common law, some
scholars have interpreted Erie as imposing peculiar constitutional
restraints on nearly all federal judicial lawmaking.73 This separa-
tion of powers argument is important, and it has found sponsors at
the very highest levels of the bench and the legal academy.74
However, because I have elsewhere analyzed this constitutional
reasoning in detail, and because other scholars have launched simi-
lar critiques of a separation of powers approach to Erie, I will not
repeat that discussion here.75
Instead, I will consider a construction of Erie based on theories
about the nature of law itself. With respect to cases like Swift and
72. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of the Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 924, 926 (1986); Resnik, supra note 39, at 237 n.69 (highlighting “the
murky bases of the decision in Erie itself [ ]which lacks specificity on what exactly was
unconstitutional”).
73. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1403-04 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1985); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on
Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 761, 791-92 (1989).
74. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“Because post-Erie federal common law is made, not
discovered, federal courts must possess some federal-common-law-making authority before
undertaking to craft it.”).
75. See Green, supra note 26, at 615-55; see, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy
Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 758-65 (2010); Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of
Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 145-47
(2011); Strauss, supra note 27, at 1581; Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity
Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915,
963-67 (2011). One clarification I would make here is to bifurcate two versions of the
separation of powers argument. The stronger objection to Swift might claim that federal
courts can never make federal general common law under any circumstance. A weaker
objection would argue that federal courts cannot make such common law without
congressional authorization. In my view, the former is implausibly radical. By comparison,
the latter argument is so interwoven with questions of statutory interpretation that it
resembles Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer’s framework for shared powers between
Congress and the President. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952). Youngstown, like this weaker
separation of powers objection, is focused on distinctions between congressional support,
congressional opposition, and, in the “zone of twilight,” mysterious congressional silence. See
Green, supra note 26, at 656-59.
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Erie, some scholars have argued that federal courts must apply
state common law because there is literally no other law to apply.76
From this viewpoint, federal courts would act “lawlessly” and violate
constitutional due process if they declined to follow state law in such
circumstances.77
If truly “[t]here is no federal general common law,” then perhaps
it would make sense that disputes like Swift and Erie could only be
governed by state common law. But what exactly does it mean to
say “[t]here is no federal general common law”? After Erie, the
phrase meant that the Court had rejected federal general common
law and had forbidden such lawmaking in the future.78 But that is
the result of Erie; it cannot be bootstrapped into a reasoned basis for
that result. To rephrase the point, Erie commanded and decreed
that there is no federal general common law, but the Court was not
simply describing conditions as they stood prior to its decision.
The most interesting interpretation of Erie’s famous phrase is
that federal general common law, even as it existed during the Swift
era, was not really “law.” Law is a many splendored thing, however,
and it has correspondingly various meanings. The following dis-
cussion will consider three of these.
One sense of law corresponds to a certain sort of governmental
phenomenon, organizing statist violence under a rubric of accept-
able procedures and bureaucratic formality.79 In this sense, federal
general common law was unquestionably law because it was an-
nounced by federal judges according to standard adjudicative
methods. When necessary, federal marshals enforced courts’ judg-
ments, and judicial edicts in this field were thought to represent the
sovereign authority of the United States. To be specific, the violence
applied through federal general common law was not rogue vigi-
lantism, nor was it intended as a hortatory governmental recom-
76. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
77. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Valid Rule Due Process Challenges: Bond v. United
States and Erie’s Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 998-1000 (2013); Louise
Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1057, 1062-70 (2013).
78. See Curtis Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing
Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 876-78 (2007).
79. See generally HART, supra note 51, at 181-82, 253-54 (explaining legal positivism as
the philosophical idea that law derives from “posited” legal authority of some sovereign rather
than natural law or other sources).
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mendation. Public officials who believed and declared themselves to
be proper lawmakers self-consciously pursued Swift-era law as
law.80 For modern positivists who wish to apply H.L.A. Hart’s “rule
of recognition,” federal judicial declarations that established
common-law rules under Swift seem just as lawful as common-law
rules of state courts throughout United States history.81
A second interpretation of what qualifies as “law” concerns forms
of social organization. Law under this view depends less on whether
a governmental agent says, “I make the law,” than on whether
society accepts particular acts of lawmaking as binding mandates.82
Here also, Swift’s federal general common law easily qualified as
lawful relative to other judicial lawmaking, including federal courts’
statutory and constitutional interpretation as well as state courts’
interpretation of torts and contracts.83 As with other judicial deci-
sions, relevant social actors largely accepted Swift’s federal general
common law as legally authoritative—even if substantively wrong—
rather than condemning it as lawless extortion.84 This helps explain
why most litigating parties followed federal courts’ decrees, and why
actors outside the courtroom often structured their relationships in
the shadow of such legal rules. Analysis of law as a coordinating and
normative social influence only confirms the apparent status of
federal general common law as, in fact, “law.”
To be sure, federal general common law was excoriated by some
contemporaries as bad law and, by Holmes at least, as not law at
all.85 Yet these critiques were notably similar to criticism of Gilded 
80. See Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 30, at 680-85.
81. See HART, supra note 51, at 112-13 (applying the rule of recognition to justify common-
law decision making).
82. See generally Francesco Parisi, Spontaneous Emergence of Law: Customary Law, in
5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 603, 603-06 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest
eds., 2000) (explaining that customary law gains status by reference to operative social
norms).
83. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 435 (noting with respect to nineteenth-century New
York law that “[p]rosecutors and courts conceivably had almost as much power under [broad
statutory] language as under the reign of common law crime”); Green, supra note 26, at 628-
29 (criticizing sharp distinctions between common law and statutory law).
84. Cf. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Interpretation, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1245, 1290-91 (1996) (noting that “Swift was defensible at the time it was decided”
and that federal courts “vastly expanded ... the Swift doctrine”).
85. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If there were such a transcendental body
of law outside of any particular [s]tate but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
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Age constitutional law, labor law, or even state common law.86 A
normal line of attack for legal critics, in history and today, is to
argue that some objectionable doctrinal target is lawless.87 Consider
the refrain of modern first-year students who wonder, “Where is the
law in the constitutional law we are studying?” The objection is only
half-serious. One may strongly disagree with Lochner-era federal-
ism, or with New Federalism, or with Roe v. Wade without believing
that such decisions truly lie outside the capacious boundaries of
what counts as law. And this remains true even if some critics press
the charge of “lawlessness” for rhetorical effect. Critics of Swift-era
federal general common law behaved much like other advocates of
doctrinal reform, yet their arguments that such federal general
common law was not “law” never extended much beyond simpler
arguments that federal courts were making “bad law.”88
Third, in contrast to positivist and sociolegal analysis, some
commentators argue that Swift’s common law was “not law” based
on ideational conceptions of law. A key element of modern legal sys-
tems is that a professional community recognizes them as law by
reference to a perceived system of rules and principles.89 The latter
exist in the realm of ideas as well as actions. Evaluative systems of
this kind are always incompletely theorized, and they often contain
statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their independent judgment
as to what it was. But there is no such body of law.”).
86. See FREYER, supra note 4, at 63-65, 72-74, 87-88; PURCELL, supra note 4, at 13, 85-91.
See generally 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 3 (1993) (“The two-hundred-year
history of the Supreme Court has been divided among a dozen or more chief justices.... Each
Court has been graded, and some have been deemed great, others mediocre, some quite
dismal. By all accounts, the Court over which Melville Weston Fuller presided, from 1888 to
1910, ranks among the worst.”). 
87. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The majority upholds the Law School’s racial discrimination not by
interpreting the people’s Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the
cognoscenti.”); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 949 (1973) (“[Roe v. Wade] lacks connection with any value the Constitution marks
as special[;] it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business imposing it.”).
88. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 532-35 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
89. See generally Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165
(1982) (“[J]udges should decide hard cases by interpreting the political structure of their
community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to find the best justification they
can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure as a whole, from the most
profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the private law
of tort or contract.”).
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internal tensions or contradictions. But just as asserted principles
of legal culture struggle to separate judicial activity from judicial
activism, legal culture likewise separates what is legally aggressive
from what is truly lawless.90
One component of operative legal culture could be called “high
jurisprudential theory” because it operates at a different level from
the governmental and social spheres that I have discussed thus far.
The importance of high-theoretical arguments as compared with
political values or self-serving guild protectionism has varied across
time. Yet American law has never fully abandoned its claims to
intellectual substance, and jurisprudential theories have been part
of that enterprise for a very long time.91
In applying ideational standards of law, some Erie theorists are
influenced by choice-of-law theories of interest analysis.92 These
scholars argue that, as a federal sovereign, the United States has no
interest in tort or contract disputes that are heard in federal court.93
In turn, this lack of sovereign interest is thought to diminish or
eliminate the United States’ authority, especially in cases in which
90. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 1447 (2001); Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional
Crises, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 579, 579 (2008) (“[T]he conventions that determine what makes
an argument about the Constitution good or bad, what legal claims are plausible, and which
are ‘off the wall,’ change over time in response to changing political, social, and historical
conditions.”); Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195
(2009) (discussing ways that legal culture can impact perceptions of judicial activity).
91. For late-twentieth-century debates regarding law and moral theory in particular, see
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637
(1998); Ronald Dworkin, Darwin’s New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998) (responding
to Posner); Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1739 (1998) (same); Anthony
T. Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1751 (1998) (same); John T.
Noonan, Jr., Posner’s Problematics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1768 (1998) (same); Martha C.
Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1776 (1998) (same); see also Richard A.
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1998). Older examples
include H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593
(1958), and Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
92. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 12, at 1281-99 (endorsing an interests analysis as relevant
to decisions involving procedural Erie questions); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of
Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974) (“[Erie] really required that the state’s interests be
balanced against whatever interests the federal government might have in the application of
its rule.”).
93. E.g., Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1942 n.27 (1991)
(explaining that, in federal diversity cases, the United States “has no ... interest as [a] federal
sovereign in the underlying claim”).
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federal rules conflict with state law.94 I have already suggested that
modern theories of choice of law are not necessarily the same as
constitutional objections.95 And this remains true regardless of
whether those objections are framed as federalism, separation of
powers, or procedural due process.
Internal complications also arise in transferring choice-of-law
principles from contexts that involve coequal states to those that
involve the United States and its constituent entities. For example,
the federal sovereign might claim a Swift-era interest in minimizing
injustice and inefficiency in its own courts. Similar principles are
used by some states to justify application of “forum law” and to
support various “public policy” exceptions.96 Moreover, the federal
sovereign has an arguable interest in any disputes that arise on
United States soil or involve United States citizens. With respect to
Swift-era cases of federal general common law, the federal sovereign
might lack a differentiated or geographically specific interest that
would be comparable to the interests of otherwise relevant states.
Nevertheless, the bare existence of a federal governmental interest
seems clear.
Against this backdrop, it seems hard to see how applying Swift’s
federal general common law violated constitutional due process.97
Swift-era litigation adhered to conventional standards of fairness
94. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (“[W]hen there is
little need for a nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal
rule of decision.”). It seems possible but not necessary that choice-of-law scholars’ concern
with sovereignty and sovereign interests might corroborate arguments of separation of powers
theorists who criticize federal courts’ application of customary international law. On one
hand, if the United States lacks a cognizable interest in its citizens’ and residents’ tort and
contract suits, its interest in suits concerning such persons’ human rights might be similarly
dubious. On the other hand, perhaps the United States’ interest in human rights litigation
could derive directly from the international sphere, where a federal sovereign might be at
least theoretically accountable for some of these violations of international law.
95. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
96. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori—Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH.
L. REV. 637, 637-38 (1960) (explaining that the law of the forum is the law primarily
applicable).
97. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (limiting the application
of state law when the state lacks any interest in the dispute); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“[F]or a [s]tate’s substantive law to be selected in
a constitutionally permissible manner, that [s]tate must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”).
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and impartiality, for example, and it respected applicable standards
for personal jurisdiction.98 Insofar as the applicable law was federal
general common law, federal courts applied it—nonpreemptively
—based on their own legal judgments.99 Any due process “problem”
in this context would require a form of constitutional rights that is
absent from familiar precedents and that lacks roots in the histori-
cal traditions and notions of popular justice that dominate modern
constitutional jurisprudence.
I should be explicit that my concerns with the pedigree of such
choice-of-law objections do not imply substantive disagreement. The
misguided impetus to constitutionalize Erie stems from two sepa-
rable sources. As a historical matter, Brandeis blazed the trail by
insisting on a constitutional basis for rejecting Swift’s common
law.100 For modern intellectuals, a “constitutional Erie” may also be
attractive because of its broad applications to other legal doc-
trines.101 By contrast, I think that Brandeis’s opinion was terribly
misguided, a path to be avoided not followed, and I am highly
skeptical of “Big Erie” theories. The next Part will explore how the
latter premises might produce an affirmative exposition of Erie’s
meaning.
III. WHAT SHOULD ERIE HAVE SAID?
Professor Jack Balkin has edited essays offering alternate jus-
tifications for two important and controversial judicial decisions:
Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade.102 These essays were
not the first or the last to try rewriting such doctrinal icons,103 but
98. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316-19 (1945).
99. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
100. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
101. Cf. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 296 (“Erie’s Kaleidoscopic quality resides in the fact that
it addressed or implicated a stunning range of fundamental legal issues.”).
102. See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP
LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed.,
2001); WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE
AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
103. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381-83 (1985); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24-31 (1959).
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they illustrate a crucial fact about American legal practice. Some
cases are so fundamental in United States law that they cannot be
taken simply at face value, with all of their corresponding virtues,
defects, flaws, and warts.104 These iconic decisions are touchstones
for the legal order’s basic values, securing some normative positions
against attack and offering a credible basis for legal reform.
Collections of Erie essays may be less marketable than those
concerning Brown and Roe, yet ongoing debates over the earlier
decision’s meaning reveal how much cultural power remains vested
in its famous name.
One can imagine a full intellectual history of how Erie has been
used over time, which would reveal a great deal about the decision’s
relevance for debates within and outside the legal community.105
Even absent such research, however, it is clear that the case retains
prominence primarily as a matter of practice, not theory. Diversity
is the oldest form of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and it yields
a large number of federal cases today.106 Despite persistent, perhaps
unanswerable questions about why Congress originally created
diversity jurisdiction,107 Erie is what made such jurisdiction safe for
a twenty-first-century audience. Indeed, without Erie, modern diver-
sity cases would seem intolerable. The wavy line that once sepa-
rated “local” legal issues from those that are “general” seems more
problematic than ever. It would seem indefensible today—as it often
did eighty years ago—for litigants to receive better or worse sub-
stantive treatment based on idiosyncrasies of their state
citizenship.108 Story’s vision of federal courts as beacons of legal
wisdom might or might not materialize in modern times, with some
104. See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV.
869, 870 (1993) (“Styles of legal argument, theories of jurisprudence, and theories of
constitutional interpretation do not have a fixed normative or political valence. Their valence
varies over time as they are applied and understood repeatedly in new contexts and
situations. I call this phenomenon ‘ideological drift.’”).
105. Freyer’s work has accomplished something like this with respect to Swift, FREYER,
supra note 4, at 45-100, and Purcell has studied Erie’s historical transitions, especially among
legal academics, PURCELL, supra note 4, at 195-308.
106. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 46
tbl.C-2 (2011) (documenting that litigants filed over 100,000 federal cases in 2010-2011 based
on diversity jurisdiction).
107. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 36, at 481-88 (describing the beginnings of diversity
jurisdiction at the Constitutional Convention).
108. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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analogy to “parity” debates concerning civil rights claims in state
and federal courts.109 Yet it seems certain that a twenty-first-
century regime of federal general common law would, on balance, be
politically poisonous and unsustainable.110
Why did Erie not just say that: why not simply reverse an old and
pedigreed precedent, Swift, that had become desperately unwork-
able? Without hindsight, Erie’s majority could not know how federal
courts’ role would be transformed by, for example, cases involving
civil rights and civil liberties.111 And perhaps the Court was loathe
in the late 1930s to explicitly and swiftly retreat from precedents
simply because the latter were seen as politically and socially
intolerable.
These are only partial answers, however, and though we may
never fully understand Erie’s perceived need for a constitutional
rationale, I think one other factor was the Court’s misreading of
Swift itself. Both the Erie majority and Justice Reed’s concurrence
characterized Erie as necessarily grounded upon either the Rules of
Decision Act or the Constitution. As Reed explained: “To decide the
case now before us and to ‘disapprove’ the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
requires only that we say that the [Rules of Decision Act’s] words
‘the laws’ include in their meaning the decisions of the local tribu-
nals.”112 Brandeis and the majority adopted the same framework,
109. See David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism
Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1267 (2007) (“As
evidenced by Swift, Justice Story was perhaps the nineteenth century’s greatest proponent
of this role for federal judges. Story intended that the federal courts would serve as expositors
of a national commercial law and thereby help immunize the national economy from
provincial regulation.”); cf. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607-08, 611-21 (1981); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1977).
110. See Marcus, supra note 109, at 1279 (“The ‘course pursued’ under Swift led federal
courts to usurp both state and congressional power. The product of this usurpation—the
general common law—was authored by a judiciary that many believed shared a procorporate
bias that interfered with state regulatory efforts.”).
111. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law,
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 971-72 (2005) (“The Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments
reoriented the Bill of Rights ... toward protecting individuals and minorities against ...
controlling majorities. The civil rights movement solidified this transformation, exalting the
‘countermajoritarian’ protection of individual and minority rights as the primary purpose of
constitutional law.” (footnote omitted)).
112. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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but they held that stare decisis could not be overcome by a mere
question of statutory construction, which demands the highest level
of precedential stability.113
I do not agree that the Court’s only choices for overruling Swift
were Reed’s approach of reinterpreting the Rules of Decision Act or
Brandeis’s misinterpretation of the Constitution. Recall that Swift’s
statutory analysis of the Rules of Decision Act was only a defensive
argument: that Congress did not require federal courts to follow
state law.114 Regardless of whether Story was right or wrong, his
narrow legislative analysis was about congressional silence and
acquiescence. Story did not and could not argue that Congress had
statutorily compelled federal courts to create federal general com-
mon law. 
The affirmative basis for Swift’s federal general common law was
not statutory in origin but common law.115 Just like many other
choice-of-law doctrines, Swift rested on the Court’s own judgment
about what sort of law should govern a case that was unquestion-
ably properly before it. From this viewpoint, Swift construed federal
common law rules concerning choice of law in order to authorize the
creation of substantive commercial law as a matter of federal gen-
eral common law.
What all of this means for Erie is that the Court did not need to
be so dismayed about reversing its prior practice. Many state courts
changed their choice-of-law doctrines in the late twentieth century
by adopting parts of the Second Restatement of Conflicts.116 And in
substantive areas of law, states moved from contributory negligence
to various forms of comparative negligence, and away from assump-
tion of the risk.117 Significant changes in common-law doctrines are
113. See id. at 77-80 (majority opinion).
114. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
115. See id. at 19.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); LEA BRILMAYER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 215-47 (1986) (providing
an overview of the evolution of modern choice-of-law principles); Robert A. Leflar, The Nature
of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1080 (1981) (defining choice of law as “nearly all
judge-made common law”).
117. Eleven states adopted comparative negligence regimes via judicial decisions. See
Christopher Curran, The Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule in the United States, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 320 tbl.1 (1992) (citing VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE 1-27 (2d ed. 1986)). In federal courts, apportionment of damages rules first took
hold in admiralty cases. See A. Chalmers Mole & Lyman P. Wilson, A Study of Comparative
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indispensable to American legal systems—especially when a chal-
lenged doctrine is seen as creating profound “defects, political and
social.”118 If the Erie majority had recognized that Swift’s ruling
could be reversed as a mere matter of federal common law, perhaps
the Court could have avoided its constitutional errors.
Another benefit of analyzing Erie as a common-law, choice-of-law
decision is providing flexibility to accommodate modern conflicts
scholarship without constitutional analysis or theoretical absolut-
ism. The fact that arguments about “interests” or “sovereignty” do
not qualify as constitutional objections does not make them irrel-
evant.119 On the contrary, such choice-of-law analysis might properly
be decisive if Erie were itself reconceived as a choice-of-law decision.
To view both Erie and Swift as choice-of-law decisions makes
sense of the juridical freedom that the Court exercised casually in
Swift and that Erie hid under its constitutional bushel. American
judiciaries have continued to change their choice-of-law rules,
sometimes radically and sometimes gradually.120 Such revisions are
presumptively acceptable because choice of law typically is not pre-
scribed by legislatures.121 Political science delegates such lawmaking
to courts as a matter of expertise and default.122 
Unlike constitutional law, choice of law has never been conceived
as a highly democratic charter that raises constitutional issues
about nonmajoritarian judicial review.123 Instead, choice of law is an
immensely important but technical legal regime that is routinely
Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 347 (1932) (discussing Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58
U.S. 170 (17 How.) (1854)).
118. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74; see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 4 (1982) (noting that, under traditional judicial lawmaking, “the law could normally
be updated without dramatic breaks through common law adjudication and revision of
precedents”); Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463,
475 (1962) (“[I]t is not doubted that it is within the sphere of appropriate judicial action to
overrule candidly a precedent that appears to be an anachronism in the light of later doctrinal
developments and a different social, economic, and political context.”).
119. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
120. Cf. Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 521, 522-23 (1982) (“Courts willing to consider the adoption of new choice of law theory
in the United States today are faced with a bewildering array of ... theories.”).
121. See Keeton, supra note 118, at 475.
122. Leflar, supra note 116, at 1080.
123. See Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 15 (2001)
(discussing the origins and modern consequences of judicial review).
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crafted, revised, and confirmed by judiciaries on their own.124 Choice
of law may ultimately be “for” the people, but it is more immediately
“of” and “by” the courts.
Like other judge-made common law, choice of law is designed to
be more flexible than some aspects of constitutional law. To twist a
famous phrase, we must never forget it is a choice-of-law regime we
are expounding.125 Here again, choice of law operates in many ways
like ordinary, workaday common-law doctrines. It is created
through judicial perceptions of tradition, policy, and policy judg-
ment.126 And if sitting judges believe that their predecessors’ rulings
are flawed—whether in light of new factual circumstances, legal
theories, political developments, or social realities—then stare
decisis is a relatively porous obstacle to reform.127 None of this
makes choice of law unimportant, nor does it mean that stability is
not valued in this field. It does, however, mean that the Erie Court
had more options and also more flexibility than Brandeis and Reed
recognized at the time.128
124. Cf. Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law in Europe: Uniformity and Integration, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 2021, 2038 (2008) (“For common lawyers, choice of law is always appropriately (though
not invariably) a choice for the judge. As this suggests, the flexibility associated with Anglo-
American approaches to choice of law is not a matter of choice-of-law methodology, but a
reflection of elemental assumptions about the judicial role.” (footnote omitted)); Mark J.
Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making,
96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 306-16 (2002); Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal
Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 2037 (1996) (“Judges create new doctrine all the time ... as
a regular part of their job. This process can be described, understood, and justified. It is one
of the basic, quotidian elements of our legal system.”); Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess?
International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 719, 788 (2009) (illustrating the
aptitude of judges to craft and implement choice-of-law doctrine).
125. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”).
126. See Robert A. Leflar, Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 323-24 (1971).
127. See id. at 325 (“It would be easy to cite ... hundreds of areas in which our common law
courts, as the interests and needs of the society changed, have moved the law away from old
positions to newer ones that better fit society’s new interests and needs.”).
128. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 352-53 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (“This Court, while recognizing the soundness of the rule of stare decisis where
appropriate, has not hesitated to overrule earlier decisions shown, upon fuller consideration,
to be erroneous.”); Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 82 (1958) (identifying “uniformity
and stability” as priorities in making choice-of-law decisions); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that stare decisis need
not create a presumption against overruling erroneous decisions).
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Even amidst the foregoing effort to describe Erie as a choice-of-
law decision, I am drawn toward methodological questions about
how to interpret iconic judicial cases. General intellectual frame-
works for interpreting statutes—as well as constitutions—including
textualism and dynamism, originalism and structuralism—have
proliferated widely during the last four decades.129 Somewhat
strangely, however, less attention has been paid to general methods
of interpreting judicial opinions. There are of course disputes over
holdings, dicta, and stare decisis. But one seldom hears discussion
of whether an interpreter should focus tightly on the “text” of a
judicial opinion, try to recapture a decision’s “original intent” or
“original meaning,” give effect to its authors’ “purpose,” or apply
“canons” to resolve ambiguities.130 To be clear, methodological de-
bates about statutory and constitutional interpretation have hardly
produced magical algorithms for interpretation that yield clear and
uncontested results. Instead, discussions about textualism, orig-
inalism, and dynamism have demonstrated that interpretation can
be controversial. But perhaps they have also identified elements
that are characteristically relevant to interpretive projects. General
frameworks for interpreting judicial opinions probably cannot
expect to accomplish anything more than this.
This Article is not the place to propose, much less to evaluate, a
general methodological framework for interpreting judicial opinions.
Instead, I will use Erie to explain in particular why doctrinal
originalism, structuralism, precedentialism, traditionalism, canons,
and functionalism would be equally or more consistent with a
choice-of-law interpretation of Erie as with any other approach.
Notably, my discussion will omit any analysis of judicial text, even
though the language of judicial opinions will often determine a
129. See generally Gluck, supra note 64, at 1924-68 (discussing both federal and state
interpretative methodolgies).
130. A recent example of methodological controversy is the use of Supreme Court briefs
from Brown v. Board of Education to oppose affirmative action plans, even though those
briefs’ authors almost certainly would have endorsed such plans, and even though such briefs
were not endorsed by the Justices or the deciding Court. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48 (2007). One lawyer who participated in Brown
has sharply criticized the Roberts Court’s use of such materials. See Adam Liptak, The Same
Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/
us/29assess.html (“‘It’s dirty pool,’ said [William T. Coleman, Jr.], a Washington lawyer who
served as secretary of transportation in the Ford administration, ‘to say that the people
Brown was supposed to protect are the people it’s now not going to protect.’”).
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decision’s meaning.131 With respect to Erie, however, I believe that
no one can defend the Court’s decision as it was written. And in
circumstances in which “plain textual” analysis does not work, other
factors must be used to support or oppose a particular interpreta-
tion. For illustrative purposes, I will consider six such factors.
Comparable to theories of originalism, for example, a choice-of-
law interpretation of Erie could, for example, claim a serviceable
basis in the Justices’ intent and the case’s political meaning at the
time. Erie’s best historian has claimed that the case embodied
Brandeis’s progressive philosophy and his skepticism toward federal
judicial intervention in matters that “should” be controlled by state
law.132 A choice-of-law version of Erie would respond to such con-
cerns directly, without any problematic reliance on constitutional
federalism or separation of powers. Although the federal sovereign
emphatically has some interest in litigation and conduct by citizens
within United States territory, that does not mean that federal
interests should prevail in federal-state conflicts of law.133 Instead
of constitutional separation of powers, a choice-of-law interpretation
would oppose Swift’s doctrinal approach based on subconstitutional
concerns about federal judicial lawmaking with respect to torts and
contracts. The latter argument would seem especially strong with
respect to broad fields of human activity in which state judicial
lawmakers possess stronger subconstitutional interests in regula-
tion than the federal government.
A choice-of-law interpretation of Erie could also find support in
the opinion’s structure.134 As we have seen, by far the weakest
part of the Court’s opinion is its last section, concerning the
131. Indeed, this is why lawyers place such importance on quoting judicial opinions. See
James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367-68 (1995) (“The
judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the case, telling its story in a particular
way; it explains or justifies the result; and in the process it connects the case with earlier
cases, the particular facts with more general concerns.”).
132. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 3 (“Brandeis sought to constrain a pervasive if amorphous
judicial practice by which the Supreme Court had, for more than half a century, used common
law techniques to expand its lawmaking powers and, all too often, to serve anti-Progressive
purposes.”).
133. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
134. Cf. Green, supra note 55, at 683-96 (discussing various sorts of structural arguments,
including those embraced by Charles L. Black, Jr.’s book Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law (1969)).
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Constitution.135 Other arguments against Swift, which the Brandeis
opinion deliberately set aside, could be easily incorporated under a
choice-of-law analysis. A principal virtue of common law’s flexibility
is its power to incorporate policy—“defects, political and social”—
and theory—“transcendental body of law”—as elements of self-
consciously hybrid and institutionally tentative doctrinal rules.136 A
more holistic interpretation of Erie would, almost ironically,
incorporate more of the Court’s reasoning than the constitutional
opinion that Brandeis actually wrote.
It may seem strange to use precedent to interpret Erie’s meaning
because, of course, Erie’s result was wholly unprecedented.137 On the
other hand, a long string of Supreme Court cases followed Erie, and
these resemble flexible, common-law adaptations much more than
orthodox applications of legal theory or faithful constitutional
interpretations.138 A choice-of-law version of Erie is more consistent
with the decision’s extensive progeny, and such precedential con-
sistency should count in that interpretation’s favor.
Likewise, tradition could be analyzed from state courts’ practice
before and after Erie. No state court considered the precise doctrinal
issue of federal general common law, which arose exclusively in
federal court. State courts did, however, confront a wide range of
other choice-of-law doctrines, and they generally did so without high
jurisprudential theory or constitutional limits.139 On the contrary,
135. See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
136. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
137. See FREYER, supra note 4, at 101.
138. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 533-40 (1958); Guar.
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-12 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496-97 (1941); see also Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court,
and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 190-204 (1958) (discussing post-
Erie choice-of-law decisions that avoided constitutional questions). 
139. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976) (adopting and applying
William Baxter’s comparative impairment methodology to determine the applicable law in a
dram shop liability case between California plaintiff and Nevada defendant); Hurtado v.
Superior Court of Sacramento Cnty., 522 P.2d 666, 669-71 (Cal. 1974) (applying governmental
interest analysis to determine applicable law in wrongful death suit involving a plaintiff from
Mexico and defendant from California); Burr v. Beckler, 106 N.E. 206, 208-09 (Ill. 1914)
(applying law of the state where contract was executed in property dispute and concluding the
seller lacked capacity to enter contract for sale of land); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480
N.E.2d 679, 683-87 (N.Y. 1985) (basing determination of the applicable law in a charitable
immunity case on whether the rule to be applied was loss allocating or conduct regulating);
Haag v. Barnes, 207 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (applying a “most significant
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choice of law was conventionally viewed as judge-made law at the
time Erie was decided, and it has largely retained that character
ever since.140 Although one could perhaps interpret Erie as a
categorical deviation from American traditions concerning choice of
law, that result should not be presumed too quickly.
Canons of interpretation, like those articulated in Ashwander, are
typically used only to interpret ambiguous texts.141 Yet the values
served by such canons could be applied to cases like Erie that are
not supported by their opinion’s language. Consider Brandeis’s in-
struction in Ashwander that “[c]onsiderations of propriety, as well
as long-established practice, demand that [courts] refrain from
passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless
obliged to do so in the proper performance of [their] judicial func-
tion.”142 In circumstances like Erie, in which the Court’s stated
reasoning is not defensible, it may be appropriate to prefer an inter-
pretation that avoids constitutional arguments if subconstitutional
reasoning will suffice. Such considerations would again favor a
common-law interpretation of Erie.
Finally, policy and function might recommend an interpretation
of Erie under which doctrinal details remain changeable and
tailored to current circumstances. No matter how solid and seem-
ingly perfect current views of “law,” “efficiency,” and “propriety” may
appear, the historical trajectories of federal courts and legal theory
from Swift to Erie—and from Erie to the present—demonstrate that
contacts” test to settle a child support dispute between residents of different states), aff’d, 175
N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1961); In re Dorrance’s Estate, 163 A. 303, 309-11 (Pa. 1932) (finding
Pennsylvania residency law applied for Pennsylvania estate tax when parties disputed
decedent’s state of domicile); Poole v. Perkins, 101 S.E. 240 (Va. 1919) (applying principle of
lex loci contractus to reach finding that a valid contract was made between residents of two
different states); Lanham v. Lanham, 117 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1908) (refusing to recognize
marriage celebrated in Michigan based on a public policy exception to Wisconsin law);
BRILMAYER, supra note 116, at 215-47 (providing an overview and analysis of conflict of law).
140. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
141. In Ashwander, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of energy distribution
associated with the Wilson Dam and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Ashwander v.
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 315-19 (1936) (plurality opinion). A plurality of the Court
refused to address the plaintiff’s facial challenge to the program’s constitutionality and
affirmed Congress’s authority to create the TVA. Id. at 339-40. In a concurrence, Justice
Brandeis articulated seven rules that represented a doctrine of avoidance of constitutional
questions. Id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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legal systems and cultures can change dramatically over time.143
There is no categorical benefit to inflexible choice-of-law rules in the
face of such changes. And it seems at least likely that a common-law
approach would provide a more functional balance of stasis and
change than any version of Erie that is based on more rigid and
uncompromising categories of law.144
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has no delusions of producing a singular and fully
persuasive interpretation of Erie—too much water has flowed past
dams and bridges for that. Instead, I have recharacterized the main
challenge that confronts both my view of Erie and the views of other
commentators: How should any interpreter analyze a foundational
decision that cannot be explained by the Court’s proffered reason-
ing? Because I view both Swift and Erie as doctrinal efforts to solve
practical juridical problems, it makes all the more sense to interpret
Erie’s solution as itself a pragmatic, common-law decision. 
By comparison, some interpreters view Erie as a separation of
powers decision that restricts courts’ undisciplined lawmaking.145
But those arguments ironically rely on interpretations of both Erie
and separation of powers that are themselves judicially and intel-
lectually invented. Other interpreters oppose Swift because it
depended on untethered “nonlegal” abstractions.146 But those argu-
ments’ abstract and theoretical architecture was constructed by no
sovereign lawmaker except the federal courts—much like the Swift-
era decisions that are under attack.
Even if readers cannot accept my own interpretation of Erie,
perhaps debates over Erie’s meaning will illustrate common prob-
lems with interpreting iconic decisions. Erie may be an extreme
example, but many jurisprudential icons do not by their literal
terms measure up to their significance in modern legal culture.
Competing interpretations of such cases may seek justification
either by reference to the decisions’ specific historical contexts, or by
143. Cf. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 195-308 (discussing transformation in the United States’
culture and legal system since Erie was decided).
144. See Kurland, supra note 138, at 214.
145. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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reference to general interpretive elements that are used for other
legal materials. Either route—and both when possible—may dis-
tinguish particular interpretations of iconic cases as more or less
persuasive. Erie might be the perfect occasion to consider such
interpretive questions. Although the Court’s own opinion almost
invites broad-stroked, lightly supported arguments based on legal
theory and the Constitution,147 I believe that such invitations are
ones that judges and scholars are best served to decline.
147. Cf. PURCELL, supra note 4, at 195 (“[Erie’s] abstract, abbreviated, and to some extent
purposely misleading reasoning invited multiple interpretations.”).
